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THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S DIREC-
TIVE THAT DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS SHOULD
BE MADE WiTHOUT REGARD TO MITIGATING MEA-
SURES: SUTTON V UNITED AIRLINES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sutton v. United Airlines,1 identical twin sisters with severe myopia,2 filed
suit underTitlel of theAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 3 alleging that United
Airlines (United) discriminated against them on the basis of a disability, or be-
cause United regarded them as having a disability.4 This case invited the United
States Supreme Court to decide for the first time whether mitigating measures
such as glasses, medication or prosthetics should be considered when determining
if an impairment is an "actual disability" under the ADA, and what constitutes a
proper allegation for being "regarded as" disabled under the ADA.5 In a seven to
two decision, the Court held that mitigating measures used by individuals with
impairments should be considered when determining whether such individuals are
disabled under the ADA, thereby heightening the standard. 6 The Court also held
that the sisters failed to properly allege that they were regarded by United as dis-
abled within the meaning of the ADA.7
One of the dissenting opinions, however, argues that the legislative history of
the ADA, as well as the regulations issued from the executive agencies charged
1. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
2. Myopia is defined as "a condition in which the visual images come to a focus in front of
the retina of the eye resulting esp[ecially] in defective vision of distant objects." WmMSM's
NEw CountsrA- D cnoNARY 755 (8th ed. 1981).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
4. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2143- 44.
5. Id. at 2144. The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. UnitedAirlines was one of a trio of
cases that required the Court to determine whether an individual's impairment should be viewed
in its mitigated or unmitigated state when determining whether an impairment is a disability
under the ADA. In Sutton, the sisters were able to mitigate their vision impairment with the use
of corrective lenses. See id. at 2141. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999), the plaintiff was dismissed from his job as a mechanic because he had high blood pres-
sure. See id. at 2135. The plaintiff's high blood pressure was controlled, or mitigated, with the
use of medication. See id. InAlbertsons v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999), the respondent
lost his job due to his failure to meet the Department of Transportation's vision standards as a
result of his monocular vision caused by amblyopia (respondent was essentially blind in one
eye). See id. at 2163. Respondent had learned to compensate for his monocular vision and the
Court viewed the body's ability to compensate for an impairment as a mitigating measure. See
id. at 2164. This Note will focus specifically on the Sutton decision as it was the key decision
rendered in the above mentioned cases. See Perry Meadows, M.D. & Richard A. Bales, Using
Mitigating Measures to Determine Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 S.D.
L. REv. (2000) for a discussion involving Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg.
6. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2143; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a)
(1994).
7. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2143; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c).
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with enforcing the ADA, expressly states that the determination of whether an
individual's impairment amounts to a disability under the ADA should be made
without reference to mitigating measures. 8 Given the Court's surprisingly narrow
reading of the statutory language of the ADA and the dissents' 9 focus on the legis-
lative history of the ADA, the question now becomes: should Congress amend the
ADA? If not, what impact will the Sutton decision have on future ADA claims?
Part II of this Note is divided into four parts: (a) the legislative action leading
up to the creation and enactment of the ADA; (b) an overview of the ADA; (c) Title
I of the ADA and some of the key terms essential to understanding the issues dis-
cussed in the Sutton decision; and (d) the case law surrounding the mitigating
measure issue prior to the Sutton decision. Part III provides a detailed explanation
of the arguments presented by both parties in the Sutton case and the Court's ratio-
nale for its decision. Part IV considers whether Congress should amend the ADA
to prevent the Sutton decision from limiting the class of individuals who are "actu-
ally disabled" under the statute and from creating such a high burden for those
seeking to establish that they were "regarded as" having a disability. After consid-
ering the positive and negative aspects of Congressional action, this Note advo-
cates for immediate legislative action, despite the inherent risks attached to such
action. In order to reinstate those disabled individuals that the Sutton decision has
excluded from the ADA's protected class, Congress must amend the ADA to ex-
pressly state that mitigating measures should not be referenced in determining
whether an impairment is a disability. In conclusion, this Note advises that imme-
diate legislative action is necessary to ensure the ADA's protected class includes
those disabled individuals that use mitigating measures.
IM DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICANS WrTH DISABILTIES ACT
A. Legislative Action Leading up to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The implementation of federal legislation to provide protection and basic rights
to those with disabilities began a little more than fifty years ago. One of the first
pieces of federal legislation guaranteeing equal rights for people with disabilities
was the Act of June 10, 1948.10 This Act prohibited the United States Civil Ser-
vice from discriminating against individuals with physical handicaps within the
workplace. 11 The next major legislation passed by Congress guaranteeing equal
rights for people with disabilities focused on removing barriers from buildings
that were financed, renovated, or constructed by the federal government.1 2 It was
8. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Justice Breyerjoined Justice Stevens's dissent, but he also wrote a separate dissent. See id.
at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. See Act of June 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351 (1948) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 633 repealed and superceded by Pub. L. No. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 523, §
7153; renumbered § 7203 and amended by Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§ 101(b)(2), 703(a)(1), 906
(a)(2), Oct. 13, 1978,92 Stat. 1118, 1216, 1224).
11. See id.
12. See Architectuxal Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as
amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1994)).
2000]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
not until 1973, however, that a significantly broader act focusing on disabilities
rights was passed. Although the Rehabilitation Act of 197313 was enacted to ex-
tend vocational rehabilitation programs, it was significant for its Title V provi-
sions, such as the requirement of federal executive agencies to develop affirmative
acoon plans for the hiring, placement, and advancement of disabled individuals
and the creation of a compliance board to ensure compliance with the Architec-
tural Barriers Act.14 Title V's provisions, however, were limited to federal execu-
tive agencies, 15 federal government contractors, 16 and any program or activity
that received federal financial assistance. 17 Because the last provision had the po-
tential to affect any federally funded program, it was the most far-reaching and
progressive provision of Title V. In 1978, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
was expanded even further to reach executive agencies and the United States Postal
Service. 18 In addition to amending section 504, Congress changed Title IV.19
Title IV created the National Council on the Handicapped (the Council) 20 in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.2 1 Numerous other acts were passed
by Congress throughout the 1970s and 1980s that continued to expand the rights of
disabled Americans in areas such as public education,22 voting rights,2 3 and fair
housing.2 4
In 1986, the Council issued a report to Congress entitled Towards Indepen-
dence that contained various legislative recommendations, one of which concep-
tualized what was to become the ADA. 25 Two years later, the Council issued a
13. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
14. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, §§ 500-504, 87 Stat. 355,390-94 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (1994)).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 791.
16. See id. § 793.
17. See id. § 794.
18. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b) (1994)).
19. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 117, 92 Stat. 2955, 2977-79 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 780-786 (1994)).
20. The National Council on the Handicapped's name has been changed to the National
Council on Disability. Pub. L. 100-630, § 205(b)(1)(2), 102 Stat. 3289,3310 (1988) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 780 (1994)).
21. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 98-221, § 141(b), 98 Stat. 17, 26 (1984).
22. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662,
84 Stat. 121,175-88 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1405-1420, 1453 (1994)). This
act guarantees children with disabilities equal access to the public education system.
23. See Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
435, 98 Stat. 1678 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee-1973ee-6 (1994)). One of the provisions of
this act required that polling places and voting booths be accessible to individuals confined in
wheelchairs.
24. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3619, 3631 (1994)). This act
included people with disabilities as a protected class under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 and prohibited discriminatory practices such as the construction of inaccessible housing
units and the failure to make reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
25. See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
64 TeMp. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1991). The Council's report recommended that "[C[ongress
should enact a comprehensive law requiring equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities,
with broad coverage and seeing clear, consistent, and enforceable standards prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap." Id. at 390 (quoting the Council).
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second report entitled On the Threshold of Independence.26 This report continued
to emphasize a need for legislative action.27 The Council's second report also
concluded that legislative action was necessary for individuals with disabilities
because of the continued discrimination such individuals encountered in employ-
ment, public transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications. The
Council's fundamental conclusions were reaffirmed in additional reports by the
Civil Rights Commission, the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunode-
ficiency Viras Epidemic, and the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of
Americans with Disabilities, as well as two polls taken by Louis Harris and Asso-
ciates.2 8
In April of 1988, Senator Weicker, a Republican, introduced the bill proposed
by the Council on the floor of the United States Senate.2 9 The next day, Represen-
tative Coelho, a Democrat, introduced the bill on the floor of the United States
House of Representatives. 30 Although introduced in the 100th Congressional Ses-
sion, no action was taken until the 101st Congressional Session. Both the Senate
and the House of Representatives entertained extended discussions on the ADA,
and it was subjected to many modifications and revisions prior to its reintroduc-
tion and approval by both Houses of Congress in May of 1989.31 The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 was signed into law by then President George Bush
on July 26, 1990,32 and became effective on July 27, 1992.3 3
B. The Americans with Disabil'ies Act of 1990
The reports submitted to Congress by the National Council for the Handi-
capped as well as the various other interested agencies found that discrimination
was strongly entrenched within all aspects of society, and that individuals with
disabilities were repeatedly isolated, discriminated against, and prevented from
entering mainstreamAmerica. Congress enacted the ADAin an attempt to remedy
the discrimination that disabled individuals consistently encountered, and to bring
such individuals into the social and economic mainstream of American life.34 In
26. See id. at 391.
27. See id.
28. See S. REP. 101-116, pt. IV, at 6 (1989) reprinted in THE Laats.AnvE HisTmay or mw
AmmucAs wrrH DisAsnruts Acr 51, 53 (G. John Tysse, ed., LMR Publication 1991) (1990)
[hereinafter LmsIf. vE HtsTRy].
29. See 134 CoNG. REC. S5106-13 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
30. See 134 CoNG. R. E1308 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1988).
31. See Edward E. Potter, Foreword to LE=II.ALSvE HsroRY, supra note 28.
32. See Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with Disabilities Act-An Historic Overlew. 7
LAB. LAw. 1 (1991).
33. See LEGSLATI HtsovRy, supra note 28, at 2. The employment provisions of the ADA
located in Title I, which is the focus of this Note, were implemented in two phases. Title I
became effective as of July 27, 1992, and applied to all business entities with twenty-five or
more employees. Two years later, in July of 1994, Title I coverage was extended to employers
with fifteen or more employees. See id.
34. See LxtmsravE HistoRy, supra note 28, at 51. The report was submitted by Mr. Kennedy
from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and it read, in pertinent part, as follows:
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to
end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with dis-
abilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to provide en-
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order to carry out the ADA's mandate to "bring persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream,"'35 the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 is
comprised of five titles, each intended to eliminate discrimination within a par-
ticular section of society: employment, 3 6 public transportation, 3 7 public accom-
modation, 38 telecommunications, 39 and miscellaneous provisions such as prohib-
iting retaliation against those who exercise their rights under the ADA.
4 0
The ADA's definition of disability is nearly identical to that of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.41 The ADA defines disability "with respect to an individual [as]
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 Although the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 is similar to the ADA in its discrimination provisions, the Rehabilitation
Act's protection is limited to discrimination by the federal government or those
contractors or institutions that have a nexus to the federal government.4 3 The
ADA makes the critical leap forward: extending the prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of disabilities to private employers, private educational institu-
tions, and private businesses and service providers. 44 In this sense, "[tihe ADA is
a cozfiprehensive piece of civil rights legislation, providing uniform, federal pro-
tection to persons with disabilities" or to those who associate with them.45
forceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities,
and to ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing these
standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities.
Id. The language expressing the ADA's purpose evolved during the legislative process but the
focus remains unchanged:
It is the purpose of this Act
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
35. LEGisLATvE hsRomy, supra note 28, at 5 1.
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
37. See id §§ 12111-12165.
38. See id. §§ 12182-12189.
39. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 221,225 (1994).
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
41. See BARBArA LImmmANN & PAUL GiossmAN, EMPLOyMENT DiSCRImNwATON LAW 274-75
(Paul W. Crane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996). The original version of the Rehabilitation Act
provided for an "'individual with handicaps" but was later changed to "individuals with a dis-
ability." With this change, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act's disability definitions are iden-
tical. See idU at 275.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Although this definition applies to all five titles of the ADA, this
Note limits it discussion to Title I and the regulations and interpretive guidelines issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
43. See LummAm & GRoSSMAN, supra note 41, at 261.
44. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7
LAB. LAW. 11 (1991).
45. Id.
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C. itle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability. 6 The ADA required the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to issue substantive regulations implementing Title I within one year from
its enactment.47 In order to fulfill the congressional mandate that the ADA be
clear, the EEOC, in addition to the regulations, issued interpretative guidelines for
the terms used in Title I, as well as for the terms used in the ADA's definition of
disability.
4 8
The issues presented by the Sutton49 case require examining the EEOC regu-
lations and interpretive guidelines to fully understand four particular terms within
the disability definition. The first three terms "physical or mental impairment,"
"major life activity," and "substantially limits" are all found within subsection (A)
of the disability definition. 50 The fourth term, "regarded as having such an im-
pairment," comprises subsection (C) of the disability definition.5 1 The EEOC
regulations define physical or mental impairment as "[a]ny psychological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
several body systems" or "[amny mental or psychological disorder."52 The inter-
pretative guidelines expressly state that "[t]he existence of an impairment is to be
determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive
or prosthetic devices: 5 3
Once an impairment is determined, the disability definition requires that the
impairment substantially limit a major life activity. The regulations define "major
46. The ADA's general rule is that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard tojob applica-
tion procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation.
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116. The EEOC's regulations reflect congressional intent that the
employment provisions of the ADA be modeled on the regulations implementing section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to the close similarities between the two statutes, the case
law developed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is generally applicable to the ADA.
See also U.S. EQuAL EPwLOYhmrE Oorom-y Co.aussoN ANDm nam U.S. DmAtmToF Jusnce,
AjmeucAis wrra DisAB=ES Acr HADBoOK at 1-3 (1992) [hereinafter ADA H ,Boou];
Lman mmN & GRoSSmma, supra note 41, at 273.
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999). The interpretive guidelines draw from the following con-
gressional reports: H.R. RP. No. 101-485 pt. I-IV (1990) reprinted in THE L.amst.m Hmsmxe
oF mm AmmcAs wrrH DisAnmrnEs Acr at 255, 288, 372, 419; S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989)
reprinted in Tan L msI.Aa HISTRY or aAmaucAs wrm DL ABnxr Acr at 51.
49. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL 2139 (1999).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
51. Id.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(), (2).
53. 29 C.F.R., app. § 1630.2(h). "For example, an individual with epilepsy would be consid-
ered to have an impairment even if the symptoms of the disorder were completely controlled by
medicine. Similarly, an individual with hearing loss would be considered to have an impairment
even if the condition were correctable through the use of a hearing aid." Id.
The interpretive guidelines exclude the following from the definition of physical or mental
impairments: (1) common physical characteristics such as height, weight, eye color;, (2) com-
mon personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper; (3) predisposition to illness or
disease; (4) other conditions such as pregnancy; (5) environmental, cultural, or economic disad-
vantages such as poverty, lack of education or a prison record; and (6) advanced age in and of
itself. See id.
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life activities" as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."5 4 Emphasizing that the laun-
dry list of major life activities within the regulations is not exhaustive, the inter-
pretive guidelines define "major life activity" as "basic activities that the average
person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.' 55
An impairment is not a disability under the ADA unless the impairment "sub-
stantially limits" a major life activity.56 An individual is substantially limited if he
or she is either significantly restricted or unable to perform a major life activity
that an average person can perform.5 7 Accordingly, an individual is not substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of lifting if he or she could not lift 100
pounds on a repetitive basis, because neither can the average person in the general
population. Also, impairments with no long term or permanent impact such as
broken bones, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza do not sub-
54. 29 C.AP § 1630.2(i).
55. 29 C.F.R., app. § 1630.2(i). The guidelines expand the major life activities listed in the
regulations to include other activities such as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. The guide-
lines stress that even this list is not exhaustive. See id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). The regulation reads as follows:
(j) Substantially limits-(l) The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricts the duration, manner or condition under which an in-
dividual can perform a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working -
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared
to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the ma-
jor life activity of working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the follow-
ing factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im.
pairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
[Vol. 52:2
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stantially limit a major life activity.5 Interestingly, the regulations provide a sepa-
rate definition of "substantially limits" when the major life activity is that of work-
ing.59 The separate definition seems to go hand in hand with the interpretive guide-
lines' cautionary statement that only when an impairment does not substantially
limit any other major life activity should the major life activity of working be
considered. 60
Neither the regulations nor the interpretive guidelines provide a laundry list of
what constitutes an impairment that substantially limits because not all impair-
ments affect individuals in the same way--two individuals may have the same
impairment but only one may be disabled due to the advanced nature of that
individual's impairment.6 1 As a result, "[tihe determination of whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by
case basis, without regard to mitigating measures." 62
Significant to the second argument presented by the petitioners is the term
"regarded as having such an impairment,"63 which encompasses three separate
scenarios. 64 First, a situation in which an individual has an impairment that does
not substantially limit but is treated as such. Second, a situation in which an indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits only as a result of how society
views such impairment. Third, a situation in which an individual has no impair-
ment but is treated as having a substantially limiting impairment.65 The interpre-
58. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 16302j). Impairments that would rise to the level of disabilities are
those such as (1) an individual whose legs are paralyzed or an individual who uses an artificial
leg because either person would be substantially limited in the major life activity of walking;
and (2) a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma or an epileptic who without
medication would have seizures because neither individual can perform major life activities
without the aid of their respective medications. See 1&
59. 29 C.F.RL § 1630.2(j)(3).
60. See id. See aLso 29 C.FRL app. § 1630.2(j).
61. See 29 C.F.RL app. § 1630.2(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
62. 29 C.F.R. app. § 163020). This is the second reference within the EEOC interpretative
guidelines that requires that the determination of whether an impairment is a disability be made
without regard to mitigating measures. See supra text accompanying note 50.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
65. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL 2139,2141 (1999). See also 29 C.FR. §
1630.2(1). The regulation reads as follows:
(1) Is regarded as having such an Impairment means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities but is treated by a covered entity [employer] as constituting such limita-
tion;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life ac-
tivities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section
but is treated by a covered entity (employer] as having a substantially limiting impair-
ment.
Id.
The interpretive guidelines provide illustrations for each part of the "regarded as" definition.
The first part of the "regarded as" definition would be satisfied if an employee with "controlled
high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting" is, nevertheless, reassigned "to less strenuous
work because of [the employer's] unsubstantiated fears that the [employee] will suffer a heart
attack" if the strenuous work continues. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1).
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tive guidelines explain that the underlying rationale of the "regarded as" part of the
disability definition was articulated by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline66 in the context of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In essence, the
Court in Arline concluded that the "regarded as" provision was included by Con-
gress because it acknowledged that "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment." 67
D. ADA Case Law Prior to the Sutton Decision
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in the Sutton case, seven of the nine U.S.
Courts of Appeals to consider the issue concluded that in determining whether an
individual's impairment amounts to a disability, the impairment should be viewed
without regard to the mitigating measures that an individual may have taken such
as eyeglasses, medication, or prosthetic devices. 6 8 These seven decisions were
guided by and are in agreement with the interpretive guidelines issued by the EEOC.
The Fifth Circuit, rather than choosing between viewing an impairment with or
without regard to the mitigating measure, created an intermediate approach. In
Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas,69 the court held "that courts should
not consider a corrective measure unless it is a 'permanent correction,' such as a
transplanted organ or an artificial joint."'70
The second part of the "regarded as" definition would be met if an employer discriminated
against an individual with a "prominent facial scar or disfigurement"-that did not substantially
"limit the individual's major life activities"--because of the negative reactions of customers.
Id. The facial scar or disfigurement would be substantially limiting only as a result of the
attitudes of others. See id.
The third part of the "regarded as" definition would be satisfied if an employee was dis-
charged by the employer "in response to a rumor that the employee is infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)." Id. The individual would be considered an individual with a
disability even though the rumor was totally unfounded and the individual had no impairment at
all because the employer treated this individual as being disabled. See id.
66. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
67. Id. at 284. Due to the similarities between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
the case law interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is generally applicable to the
ADA. See LmuIvaN ANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 273.
68. SeeArnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854,857-863 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that Congress intended a court to evaluate a person's disability based on his underlying medical
condition without considering mitigating measures); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Matczak
v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3rd Cir. 1997) (same); Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1048 (1998) (same); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d
362 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1162 (1997) (same); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.,
102 F.3d 516 (11 Cir. 1996) (same).
69. 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
70. Id. at 470-71. Prior to the Washington case, the Fifth Circuit in dictum suggested that it
would depart from the majority rule. See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191-
92 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996). The court expressly disapproved this dictum in Washington. See Wash-
ington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, 152 F.3d at 469 n.5.
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Besides the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit is the only other Circuit to hold
contrary to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. In Gilday v. Mecosta County7 1
Judge Kennedy viewed the EEOC's requirement that a determination be made
without regard to mitigating measures as, "in effect, eliminat[ing] the statutory
requirement that an impairment 'substantially limitli' a major life activity in order
to constitute a disability.' '72 Determining that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines
were in conflict with the text of theADA, Judge Kennedy concluded that the guide-
lines were not a "permissive construction" of the ADA. 3
Therefore, when the Supreme Court granted the Sutton case certiorari there
was a split among the circuits with the clear majority of the circuit courts deferring
to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. In addition, the case law developed under
the Rehabilitation Act prior to 1990 consistently protected substantially impaired
persons whose impairments were partially or wholly correctable.7 4
IMI_ THE SUTTON DECISION
In Sutton v. United Airlines,75 the petitioners were identical twin sisters with
severe myopia.7 6 Due to their severe myopia, the sisters have uncorrected vision
of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes.77 With the aid of correc-
tive lenses, however, each sister has 20/20 vision.7 8 The sisters were regional
airline pilots when they sought employment as global airline pilots with United. 79
United invited the sisters to interview for the pilot positions and although they met
United's basic qualifications, as well as those required by the FAA, United in-
formed them that they were disqualified from consideration because they did not
meet United's minimum uncorrected vision requirement of 20/100.80
The sisters filed a charge of disability discrimination under the ADA with the
EEOC and after receiving a right to sue letter,8 1 they filed suit against United in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging that United
discriminated against them because of their severe myopia, which they purported
was a substantially limiting impairment.82 The sisters asserted that United vio-
71. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997). A majority of the Sixth Circuit originally acepted the
EEOC's interpretive guidelines that require disability determinations be made without regard to
mitigating measures. See Li. at 762-64. Judge Kennedy, in his dissent, found that the interpre-
tive guidelines were in conflict with the text of the ADA. See id at 766-68 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). The Sixth Circuit modified the original opinion to make
Judge Kennedy's dissent the opinion of the court. See id. at 761.
72. Id. at 767.
73. Il at 766.
74. See Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that epilepsy is a
handicap, "even though medication controls her seizures"); Strathie v. Department of Transpor-
tation, 716 F.2d 227,228-29 (3d Cir. 1983) (reinstating a claim in favor of a bus driver who was
suspended due to his poor uncorrected hearing, even though his hearing could be corrected with
a hearing aid).
75. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
76. See id at 2143.
77. See id.
78. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
79. See id
80. See id.
81. Seeki.
82. See Sutton v. United Airlines, No. 96-S-121, 1996 U.S. Dist. Laxis 15106, at "1-2 (D.
Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
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lated the ADA because it discriminated against them because of their disability or,
in the alternative, because United discriminated against them because it regarded
them as having a disability.83 After reviewing the statutory language of the ADA
and the regulations prepared by the EEOC, the District Court concluded that "the
plaintiffs cannot state a claim that United regarded them as impaired in a way that
substantially limits a major life activity and, therefore, cannot state a claim that
they are disabled under the ADA. ' 84 In addition, the court held that the petitioners
had not made sufficient allegations to support their claim that United regarded
them as disabled because the petitioners failed to claim that United regarded their
impairment as restricting their ability to perform a class of jobs.85 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. 86 The sisters
appealed to the Supreme Court and were granted a writ of certiorari. 87
The petitioners requested the Supreme Court to address two issues under the
ADA: (1) whether the petitioners have successfully alleged that they possess a
physical impairment that substantially limits them in the major life activity of see-
ing; and (2) whether the petitioners have illustrated that United regarded their im-
pairment as substantially limiting their major life activity of working.88 Because
the petitioners, with the use of corrective lenses, have corrected vision of 20/20,
the first issue turns on whether mitigating measures should be considered when a
disability determination is made under the ADA. 89
On appeal, the sisters alleged that they are actually disabled under the ADA
because they have a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more.., major life activities." 90 Asserting that their vision impairment in its
uncorrected state substantially limits them in the major life activity of seeing, the
sisters explained that without their corrective lenses they cannot "conduct basic
activities such as driving an automobile, watching television, or shopping in a
public store." 9 1 They asserted that the determination of whether an impairment is
substantially limiting should be made without regard to mitigating measures. 92
The petitioners contended that because the ADA does not directly address the is-
83. See Brief of the Petitioners at 4, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)
(No. 97-1943). Petitioners suit was based on Section 3 (2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(1994). See id.
84. Sutton v. United Airlines, No. 96-S-121, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lmas 15106, at *18.
85. See id at * 11. The sisters contended that United regarded them as "substantially limited"
in the major life activity of working. See id. at *8. The district court found that "the [petition-
ers] complaint [is] based on their inability to obtain a single, particular job of passenger airline
pilot with United." Id. at *13. In order to claim that United regarded them as "substantially
limited" in the major life activity of working, the sisters had to prove that United regarded them
as "substantially limited" from a "class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.20)(3)(i) (1999).
86. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
87. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999).
88. See Brief of the Petitioners at 19, 34. Issue one is based on subsection (A) of the defini-
tion of disability and issue two is based on subsection (C) of the definition of disability. See also
42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A), (C).
89. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
91. Brief of the Petitioners at 2.
92. See id. at 8.
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sue of whether mitigating measures should be considered when determining whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the Court should defer to
the executive agencies that are responsible for implementing and issuing regula-
tions for the ADA.93 The EEOC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the
same basic guidelines which state that: "The determination of whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by
case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive
or prosthetic devices. ' 94 Moreover, the sisters pointed out that contained within
the ADA's legislative history are Senate and House of Representative reports that
clearly state that a disability determination should be assessed without regard to
mitigating measures.9 5 In summary, the petitioners asserted that the lower courts'
determination that an impairment should be evaluated in light of corrective mea-
sures negates the purpose of the ADA as it was intended by Congress.
The sisters argued, in the alternative, that if their vision impairment is not an
actual disability under the ADA, United nevertheless violated the ADA because
United regarded their impairment as a disability when it denied them the opportu-
nity to work as pilots for United.96 Alleging that United's uncorrected vision re-
quirement of 20/100 is not based on safety requirements but rather on an unsub-
stantiated fear that individuals requiring corrective lenses are unable to perform as
well as individuals with uncorrected vision of 20/100, the sisters asserted that United
regarded them as disabled.97 Furthermore, they claimed that when United elimi-
nated them from consideration for employment as airline pilots, United substan-
tialy limited them in the major life activity of working. According to the EEOC's
guideline, "lain individual rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and
stereotypes' associated with disabilities would be covered under this part of the
definition of disability [subsection (C)], whether or not the employer's ... percep-
tion w[as] shared by others." 98
United, on appeal, maintained that the petitioners' vision impairment is not a
disability under the ADA because, if corrected, it does not substantially limit the
93. There are three Executive agencies responsible for implementing the various titles of the
ADA. The EEOC is responsible for implementing Title I pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12116; the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for implementing Title H pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
12134; and the Department of Transportation is responsible for implementing Titles I and m
pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12149(a).
94. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2() (1999). The Department of Justice's guidelines provides that
"[tihe question of whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and ser-
vices." 28 C.A. pL35, app. A, § 35.104 (1999) and pL36, app. B, § 36.104 (1999).
95. See LEGiSLATrvE HismaRy, supra note 28, at 62,313,385. See also Brief of the Petitioners
at 15.
96. See Brief of the Petitioners at 39-41. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (the "regarded as"
prong of the disability definition); 29 CF.R. app. § 1630.2() (interpretive guidelines for the
"regarded as" prong established by the EEOC).
97. See Brief of the Petitioners at 7 n.7 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 53226,53231-32 (1994)). The
EEOC's guidelines provide "that if an individual can show that an employer... made an em-
ployment decision because of a perception of disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the
individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the definition of disability." 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(1).
98. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(); see also supra notes 57 and 65.
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major life activity of seeing.99 United argued that the Supreme Court should not
defer to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines because they conflict with the plain
language of theADAin three ways.100 First, the ADA's reference that "43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities" 101 is proof that Con-
gress did not consider individuals with correctable vision impairments disabled
under the ADA. United asserted that if individuals with correctable vision impair-
ments were included the number of Americans with disabilities would be much
higher because over 100 million Americans wear corrective lenses.102
Second, the respondent pointed out that the EEOC's guideline that requires a
disability determination to be made without regard to mitigating measures is in
contradiction with the plain language of the ADA's disability definition. The dis-
ability definition utilizes the words "'substantially limits...' in the present indica-
tive form." 103 United theorized that Congress's use of the words "substantially
limits" indicated that Congress: (a) did not intend for minor, trivial impairments
that could be corrected to come within the statute's protected class;104 and (b)
intended to convey that the "substantial limitations actually and presently exist." 105
Furthermore, the respondent asserted that if mitigating measures were taken and
such measures corrected the impairment, the impairment would not actually and
presently exist and consequently would not substantially limit a major life activ-
ity.10 6
Third, United contended that the EEOC's guideline defies the statutory com-
mand located within the ADA's disability definition to analyze functionally the
99. See Brief of the Respondent at 20-22, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139
(1999) (No. 97-1943).
100. See id. at 21-22. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)
(advising that "[c]ourts may accord less weight to such guidance than to administrative regula-
tions which Congress has declared to have the force of law").
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). Although theADA states that some 43,000,000 Ameri-
cans are disabled, the first ADA bill submitted to Congress listed the number of disabled Ameri-
cans at 36,000,000. See L .GmLaTvE HisRY, supra note 28, at 17. Admitting that the "exact
source of [this finding] is not clear," the majority in Sutton stated that the 36,000,000 finding
evolved from the National Council on Disability's report, Toward Independence. Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,2147-2148 (1999) (citing Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications ofa Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 413, 434 n. 117 (1991)). According to the majority, the National Coun-
cil on Disability's second report, On the Threshold of Independence, increased the finding to
37.3 million when the Council determined that the disability definition should reflect a func-
tional analysis. See id. at 2148. Furthermore, the majority suggested that the 5.7 million gap
between the finding in the Council's second report and the finding stated in the ADA, as en-
acted, is probably due to Congress's attempt to include institutionalized individuals with dis-
abilities in the ADA's findings. See id. (citing NATIONAL INSTrrtE ON DisABiLrry AND REIIADTA-
TON RESEARCH, DATA ON DISABILITY FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INmEviEw SUtRV 1983-1985 61-
62 (1988)).
102. See Brief of the Respondent at 9.
103. See id. at 27.
104. See idL at 26.
105. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999). See also Brief of the
Respondent at 27 (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) ("Congress'[s] use
of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.").
106. See Brief of the Respondent at 27.
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affect of the impairment on the major life activity of an individual. 107 The statu-
tory command to analyze the impairment's affect on the individual's ability to
perform major life activities is the only applicable reading that does not "read the
limiting phrase of the disability definition out of the statute."10 8
In response to the petitioners' second argument, United argued that it did not
regard the petitioners as disabled when it rejected them from employment as glo-
bal airline pilots because it did not substantially restrict their major life activity of
working. Relying on the EEOC's regulations, the respondent argued that for an
individual to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working the indi-
vidual must be "significantly restricted in [his or her] ability to perform either a
class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes [rather than the inability to
perform a single, particular job] as compared to the average person having compa-
rable training, skills, and abilities." 10 9 United maintained that it rejected the peti-
tioners from a particular job---that of global airline pilot--and not from a class of
jobs that would include all pilot positions1l 0 as well as non-pilot positionsl1l that
"utiliz[ed] similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities."11 2 Furthermore, the
respondent claimed that its vision requirement does not limit the petitioners from
obtaining jobs with other airlines that do not maintain such hiring requirements. 113
Indicative of the Court's holding in the Sutton case, the majority opined that
no agency had been given the authority to issue either regulations or interpretive
guidelines for the generally applicable terms of the ADA, including the disability
definition, because of their structural location prior to Titles I-V.114 Even though
it implied that the EEOC's regulations and interpretive guidelines construing the
disability definition may not require deference, they had "no need" and "no occa-
sion" to consider the issue in this case. 115 The Court determined that the approach
adopted by the agency guidelines resulted in an impermissible interpretation of the
ADA. 116 Viewing the ADAin its entirety, the majority concluded that'it is appar-
ent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or
mental impairment, the effects of those measures--both positive and negative-
must be taken into account when judging whether that person is 'substantially
limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act." 17
The Court reached this conclusion by reading in concert three separate provi-
sions of theADA. 118 First, by focusing on the words "substantially limits" in the
107. See id. at 16.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 44 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)(1999).
110. Global airline pilot isjust one of several types of pilot positions available. The respon-
dent suggested that as a class of jobs, pilot positions included those with "global airlines, na-
tional airlines, commuter/regional airlines, and cargo/courier airlines." Id. at 46.
111. Non-pilot positions listed by the respondents include "pilot ground trainer, flight simu-
lator trainer, flight instructor, aeronautical school instructor, as well as executive, management,
and administrative positions in flight operations for airlines, and being a consultant for an air-
craft manufacturer." Id. at 48.
112. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1999). See also Brief of the Respondent at 48.
113. See Brief of the Respondent at 46.
114. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,2145 (1999).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 2146.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 2146-47.
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disability definition, it reasoned that "[b]ecause the phrase [was] in the present
indicative verb form .... the language is properly read as requiring that a person be
presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to dem-
onstrate a disability."119 Following this reasoning, the majority determined that if
an individual with an impairment takes medication or other measures to correct
the impairment, then that individual does not have an impairment that "presently
'substantially limits' a major life activity."'120 The Court clarified this point by
stating that, 'The use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether
an individual is disabled. .". -121 The determining factor is whether the impair-
ment presently substantially limits a major life activity.122 Finding further support
for its conclusion in the plain language of the disability definition, the majority
emphasized that the definition requires that "disabilities be evaluated 'with respect
to an individual' and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially
limits the 'major life activities of such individual."' 123 The plain language thereby
mandated that whether an individual has a disability must be determined on a case
by case or individualized inquiry.124
Second, after reviewing the interpretive guidelines, the Court opined that the
guidelines stressed the impairment and disregarded whether the impairment sub-
stantially limited a major life activity. 125 It believed that as a result of this ap-
proach, if a person had an impairment such as diabetes, the person would be cat-
egorized as disabled whether or not the diabetes substantially limited a major life
activity.126 Finding that the agency's guidelines viewed individuals as members
of a group with a certain impairment rather than as individuals, the majority stated
that "this [approach] is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the ADA." 127
The third provision that the Court relied upon for its conclusion can be found
in the findings and purposes section of the ADA which states in part that "43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities. '128 The Court theo-
rized that "the 43 million figure reflects an understanding that those whose impair-
ments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are not 'disabled' within
the meaning of the ADA." 129 Determining that Congress would have made the
number of disabledAmericans significantly higher if correctable impairments were
included under the ADA, the majority reasoned that the interpretive guidelines
were contrary to the statutory command.
119. 1d at 2146.
120. Id. at 2147.
121. Id. at 2149.
122. See id. The majority provided the following example: "[I]ndividuals who use pros-
thetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still be
disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run." Id.
123. Id. at2147.
124. See id. The majority also cites to its most recent ADA decision, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (1998), in which the Court emphasized that the ADA required an individualized in-
quiry by declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.
125. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL at 2147.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994); see also supra note 101.
129. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2148.
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Evaluating the petitioners' "regarded as" disabled claim, the Court held that
the petitioners failed to adequately allege that United regarded their myopia as an
impairment that substantially limited them in the major life activity of working. 13 0
Determining that the petitioners were denied a single, particular job-that of glo-
bal airline pilot--and not a class ofjobs as required by the EEOC's regulations, 13 1
the majority held that the petitioners had not adequately alleged that United re-
garded them as disabled. 132
Justice Stevens, in dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, applied the customary
tools of statutory construction and concluded that "[the ADA] focuses on [the
individual's] past or present physical condition without regard to mitigation that
has resulted from rehabilitation, self-improvement, prosthetic devices, or medica-
tion." 133 Justice Stevens's rationale for this conclusion can be found in the ADA's
disability definition, the legislative history, and the regulations and bulletins of the
executive agencies responsible for implementing the ADA.134 Explaining that the
three subsections of the disability definition must be read as three overlapping
requirements, 13 5 Justice Stevens opined that it became apparent that Congress
intended the ADA to provide protection to those individuals who now have, or
once had, an impairment that was substantially limiting. 136 Referencing the
majority's opinion, he pointed out that if Congress had intended the ADA to cover
only those individuals whose impairments were presently and substantially limit-
ing, Congress would not have provided that an individual could be disabled if he
or she had a record of an impairment. 137 Therefore, Justice Stevens found that
reading the three prongs of the disability definition in concert permits individuals
to take corrective measures to become more employable without losing the protec-
tions afforded by the ADA. 138
Justice Stevens next turned to the legislative history of the ADA to determine
whether Congress intended an impairment to be evaluated in its corrected or un-
corrected state. He pointed out that the various committee reports from both houses
130. See id. at 2151. Prior to discussing the petitioners claim, the majority pointed out that,
"[by] its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others and to
establish physical criteria." Id. at 1250. According to the Court, "lAin employer is free to
decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an
impairment.. . are preferable to others .... " Id. Therefore, the mere fact that the respondent
had certain uncorrected vision requirements for prospective employees did not amount to the
respondent regarding the petitioners as disabled.
131. See i at 2151. A class of jobs is not defined as one particular job but rather as a broad
range of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities, within that geographical
area. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i), (ii)(A) (1999).
132. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2151. The majority also pointed out that
the interpretative guidelines published by the EEOC support its conclusion: "(Ala individual
who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but who can ba
a commercial airline copilot or a pilot for a courier service, would not be substantially limited
in the major life activity of working." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)).
133. Id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 2153-56.
135. See id. at 2153. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
136. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2153.
137. See id. at 2154. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1212(2)(B) (1994).
138. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL at 2154.
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of Congress "make it abundantly clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover
individuals who could perform all of their major life activities only with the help
of ameliorative measures. ' 13 9 Lastly, the Justice relied upon the interpretive guide-
lines issued by the EEOC that require the determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity to be made on a case by case basis without
regard to mitigating measures. 140
Having determined that the ADA protects those individuals with "correctable"
substantially limiting impairments from employment discrimination, Justice Stevens
proceeded to examine whether individuals with "minor, trivial impairments ' 14 1
should be excluded from the protections afforded by the ADA.142 Alluding to the
fact that the Court has in the past construed "remedial legislation... broadly to
effectuate its purposes," 143 Justice Stevens reasoned that even though the petition-
ers' impairment may fall outside the statute's intended protected class of individu-
als, there was no reason that the statute could not be construed to allow the peti-
tioners access to the ADA's protection. 14 4 Finding little difference between ex-
tending the ADA to cover the petitioners' impairment and the Court's extension of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to include same-sex sexual harassment as it did in
Oncale v. Sundown Offshore Services, Inc.,145 Justice Stevens pointed out that
under the Oncale approach there was no basis for treating visual impairments dif-
ferently than any other "medically controllable condition." 14 6 Furthermore, the
Justice concluded that the 43,000,000 figure1 47 was not a cap and that Congress
intended the ADA to provide protection to more than that figure by including within
the definition of disability those individuals with a "record of" impairment as well
as those "regarded as" disabled. 148
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, maintained that a remedy existed if the dissents'
more generous reading of the ADA resulted in an increased number of frivolous
lawsuits that adversely affect those whom Congress clearly intended to protect.
He proposed that the EEOC, "through regulation, might draw finer definitional
139. Id. at 2154-55. Justice Stevens relied upon reports presented by the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, the House of Representatives Committees on Education and
Labor, and the Committee on the Judiciary. See LcisLATIvE HisToRY, supra note 28, at 62, 313,
385.
140. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2156.
141. lML at 2153 (quoting Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 n.10 (Ist
Cir. 1998)). Justice Stevens was referencing impairments such as plaintiffs' nearsightedness.
See ida
142. See id at 2156.
143. Id at 2157 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). The focus of the
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities" and as such is legislation of a remedial nature. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
144. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2157.
145. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Oncale is an example of the Court extending the coverage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act to cover a class of individuals not originally contemplated by Con-
gress at the time of the statute's enactment.
146. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2158.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
148. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-
(C)).
[Vol. 52:2
SUTTON V UNITED AIRUNES
lines" in-order to prevent the statute from an overly broad extension. 149 Noting
that the majority seemed hesitant to accept the EEOC's authority because it is
limited to "this [Ttle 1] subchapter,"15 0 which does not include the disability defi-
nition, Justice Breyer argued that the ADA's structure did not deny the EEOC the
power to issue a regulation concerning a term defined outside of Title I, if such a
regulation was required to carry out the substantive provisions of litle 1.151
IV. THEADA'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON LEGISLATIVEACrION
The majority's decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.152 undermines the
broad remedial mandate of the ADA by denying ADA protection to an individual
who uses mitigating measures to control an impairment while at the same time
providing ADA protection to another individual who has the same impairment but
does not use mitigating measures. 153 Additionally, the majority's reasoning is
flawed because it confused the underlying impairment with the mitigating mea-
sures. The underlying condition that requires an individual to seek mitigating
measures is not cured by the use of those mitigating measures. The condition is
chronic and there is sometimes a risk that at some point the mitigating measure
may fail to work. For example, in Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate
Co.,154 the plaintiff suffered an epileptic seizure even though he had been mitigat-
ing his epilepsy with the use of medication for almost thirty years. 155 Under Sutton,
the plaintiff in Matczak, prior to his epileptic seizure, would have been denied
ADA protection because of his successful use of mitigating measures for thirty
years. The fact that the plaintiff suffered an epileptic seizure while using medica-
tion, however, proves that mitigating measures do not cure the underlying impair-
ment. The majority erred when it viewed mitigating measures as a cure. The
symptoms are masked or lessened, but the underlying condition, that in its unmiti-
gated state significantly limits a major life activity, remains.
The result of the Sutton decision leaves an impaired individual in a "Catch-
22" situation. On one hand, an individual can use a mitigating measure and be
eliminated from the protections provided by the ADA. On the other hand, an indi-
vidual who for whatever reason does not use a mitigating measure is protected by
theADA but, due to his or her unmitigated condition, may not be a qualified indi-
vidual for employment in general. Additionally, an individual who by use of miti-
gating measures is not substantially limited in a major life activity may still re-
quire some type of reasonable accommodation at work. For example, a diabetic
individual may require additional breaks throughout the work day for insulin in-
jections. An employer could deny an employee reasonable accommodations and
not fear liability for discrimination because the employee would be excluded from
the protection provided by the ADA according to Sutton.
149. Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. l& (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994)).
151. See id. at2161-62.
152. 119 S. CL 2139 (1999).
153. An individual with an impairment that could be mitigated by the use of medication or a
prosthetic may, for economic reasons, not seek such treatment, or the mitigating meastres may
create side effects that outweigh the benefits for some individuals.
154. 136 F3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
155. See id. at 935.
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The majority did underscore its decision's potential effect, however, by ac-
knowledging that corrective measures do not by themselves automatically elimi-
nate an individual from claiming a disability. The majority maintained that an
individual can have a disability notwithstanding the use of corrective measures if
the impairment still "substantially limits" a major life activity.15 6 The majority
emphasized that this determination must be done on an individualized or case by
case basis. Somewhat illogically, the Court stressed that an individualized inquiry
was only possible if disability determinations were made with regard to mitigating
measures.1 57 Justice Stevens recognized this flawed reasoning and stated that
"[v]iewing a person in her 'unmitigated' state simply requires examining that
individual's abilities in a different state, not the abilities of every person who shares
a similar condition." 158 It would appear then that there is no apparent reason why
the statutory mandate for an individualized inquiry cannot be made without refer-
ence to mitigating measures. Accordingly, the majority's opinion that the ADA's
mandate requires viewing mitigating measures is unfounded.
The other two rationales that the majority proffered seem equally flawed in
light of the dissenting opinion. First, if a disability must be presently and actually
substantially limiting, why did Congress include within the disability definition
that a person could be disabled if there was a record of an impairment or if an
individual was regarded as disabled? 15 9 The existence of these definitions of dis-
ability seems to negate the significance of the fact that "substantially limits"' is in
the present indicative form.
Additionally, the "record of" and "regarded as" categories undermine the
majority's reliance on the 43,000,000 figure to substantiate its conclusion that in-
dividuals with impairments that can be corrected with mitigating measures are not
part of the ADA's protected class. The 43,000,000 figure 160 is limited to those
Americans with a physical or mental impairment and does not take into consider-
ation those found to be disabled under the "record of' or "regarded as" categories.
Although the actual number is not larger, the mere fact the disability definition
includes the "record of' and "regarded as" categories illustrates that Congress in-
tended to protect far more than those included within the 43,000,000 figure. 16 1
Whether or not the Supreme Court's rationale seems transparent is irrelevant
because the Sutton decision is now the law of the land. For this to change, the
Supreme Court would have to revisit the issue and reverse its decision or Congress
would have to amend the ADA. The likelihood of the Supreme Court revisiting
the issue anytime in the near future is realistically quite slim given the large num-
ber of diverse cases seeking writ of certiorari and the fact that the Court decided
three employment discrimination cases under Title I of the ADA last Term. Con-
gressional action, however, is a viable option.
Although some disability rights advocates support await-and-see approach,1 62
this Note takes the position that immediate legislative action is necessary The
156. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
157. See id. at 2147.
158. Il at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. The "record of" and "regarded as" categories are subsections (B) and (C) of the disabil-
ity definition, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C) (1994).
160. See id. § 12101(a)(1).
161. See Sutton v. United Airlines, In6., 119 S. Ct. at 2160.
162. See Supreme Court's Mitigating Measures Decisions Produce Varied Reactions, NAT'L
DistAnrry L. REP., July 29, 1999, at 1, 6.
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wait-and-see approach entails waiting to see how the lower courts handle mitigat-
ing measures cases. Supporters of this approach view legislative action as a viable
option only if the courts repeatedly allow flagrant acts of discrimination. 163 The
underlying rationale for not taking a proactive stance is that legislative action is
inherently risky. Supporters of the wait-and-see approach fear that legislative ac-
tion will undermine the protections of the ADAby incorporating employer-friendly
provisions while simultaneously excluding plaintiff-friendly provisions. The prob-
lem with the wait-and-see approach is that it fails to provide a remedy that will
both prohibit further discrimination and reincorporate those disabled individuals
excluded from the ADA's protected class as a result of the Sutton decision.
Although courts have proven to be employer-friendly,164 Congress has gener-
ally been receptive over the last fifty years to the needs of the disabled. 165 Addi-
tionally, the ADA as a whole received overwhelming bipartisan support and both
Houses of Congress in their respective committee reports specifically recommended
that disability determinations be made without regard to mitigating measures. 166
It follows then that disabled individuals excluded from the ADA's protected class
due to the Sutton decision are more likely to be readmitted through legislative
action than through the judicial system.
Legislative action would enable Congress to amend the ADA to include ex-
press instructions that disability determinations should be made without regard to
mitigating measures. At the same time, Congress should provide stronger guid-
ance on precisely what impairments may constitute a disability under the ADA.
Although Congress in the past has rejected providing a laundry list of impairments
that "substantially limit" a major life activity, such action may be necessary to
ensure those disabled individuals Congress intended the ADA to protect are af-
forded its protections.
In addition, legislative action would provide Congress with an opportunity to
clarify the controversial issues raised by Sutton such as: (a) whether the EEOC had
the authority to issue regulations for the disability definition; (b) the degree of
deference that should be given to the interpretive guidelines issued by the EEOC;
and (c) whether an individual can be "substantially limited" in the major life activ-
ity of working. Congress need only include a provision that the EEOC has the
authority to issue regulations concerning terms defined outside of Title I if such
terms are essential to carry out the substantive provisions of Title I. Although
Congress is not likely to make the interpretive guidelines issued by the EEOC
mandatory, it should acknowledge the need for such a comprehensive guide and.
in doing so, legitimize its existence. Finally, Congress must determine that work
is a legitimate major life activity. If work is eliminated from the definition of
major life activity, the ADA's mandate to "bring persons with disabilities into the
163. See id.
164. Plaintiffs prevail in only seven percent of reported ADA employment discrimination
cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: A WIndfallfor Defendants, 34 HAiv. C.R.-C.L L Rnv. 99, 100 (1999). Further-
more, "foif those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported
cases." Id.
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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economic and social mainstream ' 167 will be hindered because employers would
be able to circumvent the reasonable accommodations provision of the ADA.
Without legislative action, the Sutton decision will circumvent Congress's in-
tended purpose of the ADA. The ADA's protection will be limited to those dis-
abled individuals who, even with the use of mitigating measures, are substantially
limited in a major life activity; ADA claimants will need to provide detailed fac-
tual records of how their impairment with the applicable mitigating measures sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. Additionally, in light of the majority's skep-
ticism that an individual can be substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, 168 ADA plaintiffs should avoid making such allegations. Moreover, the
majority's skepticism regarding the major life activity of working carried over to
the "regarded as" allegation, thus limiting the evidence an ADA claimant can use
to prove a "regarded as" claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority's decision in Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc. 169 is in direct contra-
diction to the legislative history of the ADA and to the interpretive guidelines is-
sued by the EEOC. In order to resolve these contradictions and ensure that the
ADA continues to prohibit discrimination based upon an individual's disability,
immediate legislative action is not only appropriate, but necessary. Given
Congress's continuous support of disability legislation, the risk involved with seek-
ing legislative action at this time seems minor, especially when compared to the
impact of the Sutton decision on ADA claims and the employer-friendly stance of
the judicial system.
Sara Gagne Holmes
167. THE LmislAnvE Ihs'roRY, supra note 28, at 51. See also supra note 34 and accompany-
ing text.
168. The majority implied that viewing work as a major life activity was problematic:
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities" includes working, we
do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We note, however, that there
may be some conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include work,
for it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason
of [an impairment, from working with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an
impairment, when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap."
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. CL 2139, 2151 (1999) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. at 15,
School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277)).
169. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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